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# Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 36/80)



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## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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AFGHANISTAN

SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT EYEWITNESS REPORT ON AFGHAN GUERRILLAS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Sep 80 pp 43, 45-51

[Article by Special Correspondent Jean Bertolino: "Clash Between Two Dogmatisms"]

[Text] Jean Bertolino (Albert Londres Prize 1967, Prix Goncourt for Journalistic Excellence) is one of the extremely few journalists to have shared over a period of several weeks the day-to-day living of the Afghan guerrillas on both sides of the Pakistani border, which he crossed clandestinely together with them.

The sympathy he feels toward them has not clouded his lucidity. It is therefore an unbiased eyewitness report that is being presented here to our readers, which conceals nothing--neither the internal divisions within this resistance movement nor the more general problems being posed by the Afghan society. Jean Bertolino also strives to assess--more rigorously than he usually does--the strategy and tactics of the Soviet forces of occupation.

The largest concentration of Afghan refugees is to be found in the north-western province of Pakistan--some 600,000-800,000 in all, 95 percent of whom are of Pashtoon origin. Their tent camps are sprawled out over barren expanses on the outskirts of Bannu, Kohat and Peshawar. The allowance granted them by Pakistan--4 rupees (2 French francs) per person per day and the international gifts, together, hardly suffice to keep them alive, and appease neither their hunger nor their rancor.

This massive influx of destitute human beings, nursing their hatred of the Soviet occupying forces under the oppressive heat, worries the Pakistani authorities. The lack of interest being shown in their plight makes these refugees feel they are being abused and neglected. The Palestinian experience has already proven that this state of dereliction leads to revolt and acts of desperation.

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Divided among the Pashtoons, the Punjabis, the Sinds and the Baluchis, Pakistan is not secure from internal conflict. Precisely because of the total absence of racial and cultural unity, a conflict, should it break out, could have disastrous consequences. even to the possible splitting up of the country. The proliferation of Afghan organizations engaged in a merciless competition in Peshawar is currently giving the government a respite that the latter is using to play its own personal game, which consists of openly displaying a cautious neutrality and urging unity among the Afghans, but of doing nothing that could permit this unity to take place. It is presently subsidizing certain leaders to have a hold over them and constrain them to act in accordance with its own interests. This ambiguity has its explanation. To minimize the risk of an internal flare-up, Pakistan will have to exercise greater and greater vigilance.

## Retrograde Mentality of Rebel Chieftains

Every Afghan resistance group includes in its name the term "Islamic"--the Afghan Islamic Association, the Afghan Islamic Party, the Islamic National Front, the Islamic Revolutionary Movement, etc.--but not one of them has a political platform. Their leaders--religious men, theologians, so-called doctors or engineers--are incapable of identifying what it is that differentiates among them. They talk of the "jihad"--holy war--against the Soviets, of the necessary mobilization of the masses for the struggle and the future building of a hard-core Islamic republic on the Khomeiny model. When they are asked about their program, they reply evasively: "It is based on the Koran and on the principles of Islam," then turn the conversation toward less undesirable topics. This is how Sabatullah Modjahidi, chief of the Afghan National Front, Pr [as published] Rabani of the Islamic Association, and engineer Gulbudin of the Afghan Islamic Party responded during our meetings.

The fact is that all these men are very close to each other in their views and that only their personal ambition separates them. It is practically impossible to hold a conversation with them on any topic touching on their traditional way of life. The subject of women is taboo. To raise the the problem of their alienation or to suggest their emancipation is deemed a sacrilegious act. If, in addition, one brings up social questions--if, for example, one begins to talk of agrarian reform--he immediately becomes suspect. For them, views of this kind can only be held by a communist sympathizer.

## Separate Group

The broad outlines of a conciliation among the principal resistance groups was sketched out recently. Six of the largest organizations agreed to form the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan. The Afghan Islamic Party, presided by engineer Gulbudin, not having obtained representation in accordance what it claims to be its true importance--it is the oldest and perhaps the one with the largest number of followers--refused to join. It is currently a separate group.

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The election of the president of the Alliance was the object of sordid dealings. Almost all of the group chieftains vied as candidates. None was elected, because the jealousies that would have resulted would have immediately aborted this effort to achieve unity. Mr Sayaf, a neutral and a member of the Djamiat Islami as well as the Hesbi Islami (an organization formed as the result of a split within engineer Gulbidin's party), was elected by a slight majority. This theologian, a graduate of Al Azhar university, talks in exactly the same terms as those who elected him to the presidency. Imprisoned at Kabul from 1974 to 1980, released from prison through a mistake under Babrak Karmal in January, he is content to loathe the Soviets and their Afghan allies, but expresses no progressive ideas. The backwardness to which Afghanistan has been held is reflected in the mentality of their Muslim leaders.

#### Quarrels Over Power

When I asked attorney Modjahidi, who himself had been a candidate for the presidency of the Alliance, what he thought of the choice of Mr Sayaf, the winner of the election, Mr Modjahidi replied significantly as follows: "The alliance really means nothing. It has no real power. Only the Council of the Revolution has the power to take decisions." Now then, the Council of the Revolution, which is supposed to consist of the heads of all the parties, is purely fictitious. The few meetings at the summit that have taken place have been mere get-togethers of empty chatter, ending in no concrete results whatever.

This said, the same holds true among the pro-Soviets: agreement is far from prevalent among them. Long-standing rivalries pit the two wings of Afghan communism against each other: the Khalk (the People), which was led by Taraki and Amin before their falls, and the Parcham (the Flag), which is headed by Babrak Karmal. These two parties are, however, motivated by the same ideology and have the same sponsor.

The loss of its governing power by the first, which made it possible for the second to move in and replace it, is now the underlying cause of frequent quarrels that sometimes end up in gun battles. Here, the consequences are much more serious than for the Islamics, in that the Muslim candidates for leadership of the jihad jostle each other to take up arms against the occupying forces and their local allies, while in the communist camp the aspirants to the leadership are becoming scarcer and scarcer, and the Afghan army, which was its main support, is dwindling alarmingly day by day. From 80,000 troops, its strength has dropped, it is said, to 20,000.

The army renegades who rejoin "Allah's warriors" are not always well received, judging from the misadventure that befell Commander Abdul Raouf recently. He had just deserted with his entire regiment, after having liquidated the political commissars by his own hand. A unit of the Hesbi

Islami, determined to snatch from him his precious booty of Kalachnikov's and RPG's (antitank rocket launchers), laid an ambush for him and his men. Taken by surprise by this absolutely unexpected attack, his men surrendered and were stripped of their weapons and belongings. Taking their wounded with them, they arrived hungry and disarmed in Pakistan, where they were packed into a refugee camp. They had wanted to fight against the Soviets: And now, here they were, confined to inaction.

#### Highly Paid

Those who had shamelessly stripped them were Muslims like themselves and guerrillas, whose covetousness, however, was greater than their brotherliness. The stolen weapons were not even distributed among the Hesbi Islami militants, who needed them, but were sold on the open market of Dara at a price of 10,000 French francs a Kalachnikov.

"Who offered them to you?", I asked one of the retail merchants.

"Some Hesbi 'mujahidin' [Muslim freedom fighters]."

"And now, who buys them from you?"

"Other mujahidin."

In this kind of transaction, the merchant receives a commission of 5,000 French francs per Kalachnikov. The price of a stolen submachine gun is 15,000 French francs. It is he who is being highly paid for a "just cause." Meanwhile, an embittered Commander Abdul Raouf roams the streets of Peshawar and recounts his embarrassing story to anyone who will listen.

#### A Mujahidin Base in the Kunar Valley

The clandestine crossing of the Afghan border is a painful experience: One's feet blister and peel trying to keep up with the woodsmen, who, shunning the mule trails, prefer to climb the mountain straight upwards and do so with the agility of a wild goat of the Pyrenees. By night, on a makeshift raft made of inflated cowhides, I crossed the Kunar river, a turbulent watercourse lighted up periodically by rockets being launched from the "khalqi" [communist] villages and by the scanning beams of Soviet searchlights. The motor vehicle road linking Jalahabad to Shagaserai and Barricott--three riverside settlements beleaguered by the Soviets--is scarcely 200 meters from the point at which we landed. We then proceeded in single file on tiptoes. After 1 hour's perilous climb along the bed of a seasonal mountain stream, which was dry during this period, we reached the mujahidin base. A clump of mulberry trees concealed the headquarters tent, as well as an open-air mosque, the area of which was marked out by a row of small stones. Cleverly hidden in a bend



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bordered by scree, this lair was invisible until the last moment, even at night when it was lighted by the pale yellow light of a storm lantern besieged by mosquitoes and butterflies.

We will see the war on a microcosmic scale in this valley which opens up to view as we climb up the nearest summits. Far down below us, the village of Babel and its terraced hillside farms spread out along the banks of the Kunar river. To reach the base, we had skirted this village without being aware of it. The mujahidin who occupy this valley were born there. From their "mortchars" [mountain lookout points], veritable eagle's nests hidden in deep hollows that are partly stoppered by stacks of stratified stone, they stand watch over the road below, and view every day their abandoned homes and fields. The khalqis, those "communist" villagers whom they know very well, with whom they grew up, who are their cousins, their brothers, are cultivating those fields in their [the mujahidin's] stead.

In March, during the Soviet offensive against the Kunar, the rebels accompanied their families to Pakistan, where the latter now live in refugee camps, then returned to go underground as guerrillas. The height of a mountaintop now separates the adherents of a very decidedly Stalinist Marxism-Leninism, sustained in their current occupancy thanks to Russian backing, and those of an Islam not yet differentiable from a feudalism, who are dependent upon allies among the most reactionary of the Muslim states.<sup>1</sup> Between the ones, electrified by their political commissars, and the others, fanaticized by their mullahs, there rages a war, a fratricidal war, without quarter, a clash between two antagonistic dogmatisms. The Soviet intervention has unquestionably strengthened considerably the side of the believers.

It is from within the Koran, from the prayers recited punctually five times a day, that Afghan nationalism today draws its strength and derives its reason for being. "Allah akbar!" ["God is supreme!"] and "Death to the Chourawis [Soviets]!" are the two inseparable expressions that punctuate daily the speeches of the chieftains and the prayers.

#### Suppressed Furies of the Dinosaur

Soviet convoys pass daily through the valley of the Kunar. Perched in the first mortchar of the river, at less than 300 meters from Babel, we watch them at our ease.

At one time, it had been the Khalqis who fled and lived in hiding. The mujahidin reigned as masters of this region, the strategic importance of which is obvious. To go into Pakistan to replenish their food supplies and munitions, the Islamic underground fighters cannot avoid crossing the road and the river. The Soviets have understood perfectly that, to stamp out the guerrilla activity in this sector, they must control the sector entirely and chase the guerrillas from the inhabited areas. This is what they have done, hitting them very hard at times.

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However, the use of napalm or of poisonous gas has never been confirmed to me in the field. The occupying forces repress here using artillery, incendiary bombs, machine guns, rockets launched from tanks, helicopters and Migs. They can do quite a lot of damage with these means. Of the hospital beds in Peshawar and Kohat, 25 percent are occupied by Afghan refugees. To go from this into talk of genocide is a quantum jump of exaggeration that one should be careful not to make. The Soviet strategy is subject to imperatives that hardly permit of exceedingly ill-considered actions.

The Russians cannot at one and the same time posit themselves as brotherly allies of a government, the more so if, as in this case, they have themselves been instrumental in putting that government in power, and also carry out a blind repression. The ideal solution for them would be for the Karmal regime to eventually establish a popular base sufficiently broad to enable the Russians to reduce their military action, the effects of which on the population are entirely contrary to their objectives. Their aim was, even though what is occurring is actually the opposite, to withdraw the Afghan people from the influence of the mullahs and the feudal leaders so as to be able to institute in this country a political and social structure identical with their own.

#### Struggle Among Irreconcilable Brothers

On the third day after my arrival among the guerrillas, Hakim decided to attack Babel during the night. At dusk, after the prayer and the mullah's exhortations, which were repeated in chorus by the guerrillas, the raid got under way. For these "fanatics of Allah," who systematically identify the communists with "collabos" ["collaborators"], the khalqis are renegades who must be mercilessly punished. Here they were, then, making their way down the river, bent on capturing the village and exterminating its occupants. Blood ties no longer counted.

For more than three hours a colossal uproar shook the valley. The whistling of bullets, the explosions of mortar shells, the crackling of machine gun fire, the staccato bursts of the Datchakas--the symphony of the battleground, in sum--left the impression that Babel is well defended. A sheaf of red rockets rose from the village, calling for Soviet artillery support, which began immediately to pound the mountain. At dawn, the attackers pulled back without having achieved their objective, but having, according to them, killed six khalqis. They then mined the road in anticipation of the tanks that would be certain to follow. In fact, one tank was blown up under our very eyes. The others lined up, swung their turrets around and responded to the harrassing fire of the moujahidin. They waited until the damaged tank had been loaded on to a semi-trailer, then quit the place leaving not the slightest bit of tangible evidence of their vulnerability.

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But then comes the "punishment" by helicopters. These MI 24's, which the Soviets are now testing in Afghanistan, resemble sharks. Distinctive in outline, sparkling in the sun, they have two short ailerons, each equipped with four guns and four rockets. The noise of their propellers is frightening. They swoop down, fire, and rise sharply again, skim along the ground, poke about over the rocks, seeking out their victims. The Afghans, who do not run away from the tanks and display outstanding courage in combat, suddenly panic. They feel powerless in the face of these monsters that pockmark the ground around them without their being able to retaliate. Having neither guided missiles nor anti-aircraft defenses, they coil up in recesses under the rocks and pray.

#### The Result of a Measured Action

Although very frightening, the helicopter carousel left only several wounded. As soon as the skies were clear once again, fighting resumes between the Muslims and the khalqis of Babel. By nightfall, short of ammunition, the mujahidin withdraws...

It is the guerrilla action in a single valley, against a single village and a single portion of the road, that we have seen here. There are thousands of valleys like this one in Afghanistan. If the Soviets want to clean them all out, they have not yet begun to resolve all their problems.

For all that, one might ask what would have been, in the same circumstances, the attitude of the American forces or of the French colonial troops, which never hesitated to use the most expeditious means of finishing off their adversaries. Indeed, four containers of napalm would have sufficed to clean out the rebel positions in the Babel sector. This fact reinforces my feeling that the Soviet repression, far from bordering on genocide, is more the result of a measured action. When drastic action becomes necessary, the Soviet army is fully capable of crushing under tons of steel any refractory zone. But it also faces the imperative of not letting itself pinned down within the infernal bounds of a widespread guerrilla war. This does not mean that in the long run it will not allow itself to become trapped, as the American forces did in Vietnam. We can say, however, that for the moment their leaders are still aware of the mistakes they must not commit.

When they saw installed in Teheran the regime of the Ayatollah, who succeeded in escaping politically the empire of the United States without turning toward the USSR, and who moreover dumped the Americans and the Soviets into the same basket, held them both up to public scorn and disparaged them both with the same harangue, the Russian leaders no doubt experienced a moment of deep misgivings. Far from casting covetous eyes upon the warm seas, as is being asserted by some experts on the basis of criteria that became obsolescent almost 50 years ago, they must certainly

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have realized that this Islamic resurgence would find fertile terrain in Afghanistan for its propagation, a terrain on which a guerrilla action of some magnitude, fomented by the feudal leaders and the mullahs, was already raging against the regime of Taraki, who was being accused of being a felon and an atheist. By the same token, they could not afford not to take into account the 60 million Muslims living in the Soviet Union who might also become contaminated if nothing was done to erect a barrier against this surprising redeployment of the Koranic doctrine, which is totally opposed to their own, and who sometimes resort on their own to rather effective ways of imposing their convictions.

#### The Specter of Contamination

To allow Afghanistan to again become a feudal, turbulent, uncontrolled state capable of contaminating the USSR's own territory, or to prevent this militarily, facing the risk of having to take the entire population on its back and of having to accept, when all is done, a defeat whose consequences could be far-reaching: this was the dilemma in which the Soviets found themselves trapped. The specter of all the Moslems in the Soviet Union rising as one against their guardians was something to make the Russians tremble in fear.

The fact is that if the notions of an Islamic revival succeed infiltrating into the USSR among that population, which is not yet entirely weaned from Koranic influences, there is the danger--as was proven by the fraternization that took place between the Soviet troops of Oriental origin and the Afghan believers<sup>2</sup>--that they will find fertile terrain to propagate and spread like an oil spill. This could indeed mean the end of Russia the Great, of which the Soviet Union is but a beginning phase, the splitting up of this vast multinational enigma.

Vietnam was never a threat to the West. Afghanistan is today a spike driven into the Soviet giant's vulnerable spot, its Achilles heel. The deeper it is driven, the more violent will be the USSR's reaction. If the Pashtoon, Baluchi, Hazara and Uzbek guerrillas do succeed in holding the Soviet expeditionary force in check, the USSR strategy will change, and it must then choose between genocide and a withdrawal of its armed forces behind the Amou Darya river, which was to have served as a link between the two countries had the minds of those men not been obfuscated by their dogmas.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Saudi Arabia and several emirates are providing increasingly substantial aid to the Afghan resistance organizations.

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2. The first divisions that invaded Afghanistan consisted of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkomans...with the intent of evoking sympathy among the Afghans. The opposite occurred. These troops fraternized with the Muslims and the Soviet command promptly withdrew them and replaced them with troops of Nordic origin.

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ISRAEL

RABIN SEEKS ACCOMMODATION WITH JORDAN, MODERATE PALESTINIANS

LD180725 Paris L'EXPRESS in French 20 Sep 80 p 85

[Interview with Yitzhak Rabin, former Israeli prime minister, with Hesi Carmel: "The New Alternative"--date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Do you think an agreement guaranteeing autonomy for the West Bank Palestinians is possible?

[Answer] At present such an agreement seems impossible. The positions taken up by Begin and al-Sadat are too far apart. For al-Sadat autonomy is an initial step toward establishing a Palestinian state on the West Bank, in East Jerusalem and Gaza. For Begin it is the means of realizing the dream of a great Israel while granting autonomy to the Palestinians.

As far as I am concerned, I reject the Egyptian idea, which would involve:

1. Recognizing the Palestinians as exclusive holders of legitimate powers;
2. Giving the autonomous territory the three attributes of a sovereign power: a legislative body with 100 members, an executive with 15 members and a legal system ranging from courts of summary jurisdiction to the high court of justice;
3. Applying autonomy to all the territories held by Jordan and Egypt before 1967.

[Question] What are you proposing?

[Answer] An alternative based on the Camp David agreements.

[Question] Is that possible?

[Answer] Yes. Two principles were accepted at Camp David. First, the need for a 5-year transitional period. Second, the need to guarantee that the system implemented during that transitional period will enable the sides to put forward their positions with a view to a definitive settlement. Within this framework we have an alternative, the Palestinian or Jordanian solution.

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Under the Palestinian solution the Palestinians could be given autonomy on the West Bank and in Gaza, excluding the regions vital to Israel's security (Jordan Valley, Jerusalem--which was not included in the Camp David agreements--the region of Ezion and the region south of the Gaza Strip). Elsewhere the Palestinians would enjoy very broad autonomy aside from internal security questions (struggle against terrorism), for which Israel would keep responsibility.

This being the case, the Israeli villages on the West Bank would remain during the 5-year transitional period for which Camp David makes provision.

Specific agreements would govern questions concerning freedom of movement, trade, the distribution of water and so forth.

Under the Jordanian solution, Israel would offer Amman joint protection for the whole territory, aside from Jerusalem, for 5 years. The Jordanians would be responsible for administering the territory and Israel would keep troops there. Internal security would be controlled jointly by Jordan and Israel.

[Question] How can this solution be promoted?

[Answer] First, by an Israeli Government statement announcing that Resolution 242 is applicable to the West Bank and Gaza. Unlike the Likud, which rejects any foreign sovereignty west of the Jordan, we in the Labor Party agree to share power and to withdraw troops from some of these territories. A change in sovereignty will only be possible after a transitional period, within the framework of a definitive peace treaty. The advantage of this offer is that it does not force [Jordan's King] Husayn to accept the principle of partitioning the territory in the short term.

[Question] Do you think Husayn will come to the negotiation table if the Labor Party comes to power?

[Answer] I think that Husayn or the West Bank Palestinians will come to Jerusalem after a period of time. They will come when they realize that Israel is not isolated in the United States and that a national consensus has been established. We will then find partners with whom to dialogue.

[Question] Husayn or the West Bank Palestinians?

[Answer] Husayn will find it difficult to come to the negotiation table without a change in attitude by Iraq and Saudi Arabia--an impossible change at present. The path which at present strikes me as the most logical is through the moderate leaders on the West Bank. This could prompt Husayn to take part in the negotiations.

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[Question] Do these moderate West Bank leaders exist?

[Answer] Yes, I have met several in the past few months (Rabin showed the text of an interview he had with Bethlehem Mayor Ilyas Frayj--Carmel note). There are moderate leaders with whom agreement could be reached.

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LEBANON

PHALANGIST PARTITION MEASURES DISCUSSED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 15-21 Aug 80 pp 24-25

[Article: "The Phalangist State: A 15,000-Man Army; Judicial, Administrative and Tax Agencies; and the Steering of Information and Education"]

[Text] Here AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI is giving the Lebanese and the Arabs a true picture of the agencies set up by the Phalangist Party in the regions it controls. It levies taxes, judges the people, manages the ports and directs education and information. It is a state within a state, or, more precisely, a state looking for the opportunity to proclaim itself. The purpose of this article is to warn about the national disaster which might occur in Lebanon tomorrow because of the absence of state authority, Arab divisiveness, prolonged isolation and Israeli aspirations.

People who asked about the reasons for the visit to Lebanon of Gaston Thorn, foreign minister of Luxembourg and president of the European community, heard from him personally that the European states are particularly concerned about Lebanon, and want to know more about its circumstances before taking any new initiative to help it overcome its ordeal, within the context of whatever might be proposed on the Middle East by the end of September.

The thorn (al-shawkah being the Arabic word for Thorn) pricked the side of Europe after the incidents of 7 July and the Phalangist Party's partitionist moves, while the European states were trying to firmly establish Lebanese unity in all spheres.

Those who met with the president of the European Community say that he raised definite questions about the nature of what happened on the Maronite level in Lebanon, and about the significance of the partition measures initiated by the Phalangist Party against the territorial integrity of Lebanon and the sovereignty of the legitimate authorities in the country.

After a number of contacts made by the European delegate, it became clear that he had returned with a gloomy picture of the situation in Lebanon.

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A senior official asked him whether what had happened in Lebanon constituted actual partition of the country, and Gaston Thorn replied, "This might be so, but it will never become partitioned until it is unequivocally declared."

This is not the first time that a visitor to Lebanon has spoken of the country's situation and the partition measures of shaykh Pierre Jumayyil, head of the "Unified Lebanese Forces" under the slogan of "Liberation of Lebanon." Similar comments have also appeared in diplomatic reports submitted by accredited diplomats in Beirut to their countries' capitals.

The most striking thing today may be the fact that Thorn has no doubt about the actuality of the partition measures, but considers the non-declaration of partition a phase which might last for some time, since circumstances have not permitted the proponents of the partition plan to reveal themselves and declare openly what they want.

In Lebanon today, partition is no longer the subject of whispers. It is talked about openly, perhaps because some of its manifestations cannot be concealed. Also some aspects of the partition moves are seriously encroaching on the legitimate authorities, which has led the latter to wage a struggle for survival and to reveal what is going on.

Partition in Lebanon will not take on moderate manifestations, because partition steps are basically radical steps aimed at establishing an entity which rejects everything around it. This may be what causes the citizens to evaluate each step according to how much it unifies or divides the country.

A True Picture of Partition

What is the picture which Thorn brought back about the climate of partition in Lebanon?

In his meetings with Prime Minister Salim al-Huss, the latter stressed an old point of view--that Europe cannot take any initiative in Lebanon or the Middle East, unless it can get through to the American administration and coin its support for such an initiative.

Al-Huss warned that the Middle East is going through a very painful period, and that every effort should be made to help the region face the future without further eruptions. Otherwise, some seeds of unrest might grow into large-scale partition movements. These in turn would expose the region to the possibility of international intervention, turning it into a pit of endless struggle.

The conversation shifted to the climate of partition in Lebanon. Prime minister al-Huss began enumerating the manifestations of partition which have appeared recently and which have begun threatening the fate of the

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legitimate government. In brief, he said that the European Community could also apply some kind of influence, based on its relations with the Lebanese forces, to forestall these partition steps.

The partition steps are basically no secret to the political milieu. Danny Chamoun referred to some of them when he criticized the "fascism of the Phalangist Party." Statements made by the Political Council of the (Leftist) National Movement also referred to them, when the council refused to accept the de facto situation and submit to Phalangist domination. Some of the features of partition referred to by informed political circles are as follows.

1. Security partition: The Phalangist Party has implemented an autonomous security policy in the regions it controls, and has established, for this purpose a Phalangist police, and special units to curb violations, write tickets and make referrals to the judicial system.

This step began with mobile patrols, under the guise of protecting people, to curb violations and combat smuggling and gambling. It then changed into a complete security apparatus connected with the operations room of the Phalangist War Council and concerned with handling security matters.

Phalangist sources say that the Phalangist security apparatus is composed of traffic police units and other units from the security forces, which concern themselves with municipal and village matters, judicial records and vital statistics, along with strike forces to arrest criminals and refer them to the courts.

These sources say that all state internal security force posts are under the control of the Phalangist Party's internal security apparatus. The latter has required these posts to inform it of every arrest or action they take even before informing the legitimate authorities.

This may be the reason why some posts are arresting criminals and the Phalangist security agency is taking them, saying that it prefers its own forces to carry out this or that operation.

It is worth mentioning that the Phalangist security apparatus receives its orders from Bashir Jumayyil. But this does not prevent some of its officials from carrying out special operations, especially to prevent any competition against their smuggling, bribery and gambling partners.

A 15,000-Man Army

2. Defense partition: in the wake of the Phalangists' 7 July operation against the National Liberals Party, the Phalangist party was able to declare its control over all the towns and villages of the 3 districts it was active in. This control was declared in order to propel the "Unified Lebanese Forces" into first place as an army for this region, supplied with the most modern arms and Israeli-made Sherman tanks.

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This role has reinforced Bashir Jumayyil's declaration that these forces will be a liberation army for all other Lebanese areas. Furthermore, it has reinforced the Phalangists' rejection of the Lebanese Army's entry into their regions, on the assumption that what the Phalangist militias are doing is sufficient.

The Phalangist army is composed of 15,000 men distributed over the 3 districts and East Beirut. The Phalangist army is divided into branches similar to the branches of the Lebanese Army, and includes commando units, mobile units, artillery units, armored units and a naval force.

The Phalangist army is equipped with 115, 130 and 122 millimeter field artillery, Sherman tanks, heavy mortars and rocket launching units, in addition to heavy and light machineguns and bazookas.

The command of the Phalangist army has divided its regions into geographic units, each one of which is allowed freedom of movement and coordination with other units when necessary. The command pays about 700 Lebanese pounds to the full-time combatant and a nominal sum to reserve fighters whenever they are called up. Half the Phalangist force is composed of full-time combatants, while the remainder are students, workers and partisans distributed throughout the villages in the form of internal protection militias.

3. Financial partition: Finance minister Dr 'Ali al-Khalil says that the state loses about 800 million pounds a year because of the illegal ports and the tax raising done illegally by political forces.

The fact is that the Phalangist Party has for some time been carrying out financial measures and steps in all fields. Under the slogan of "steadfastness tax" the party imposed a percentage on individual incomes, and on homes according to their size and number of occupants. It has also imposed taxes on cinema tickets at the rate of 1 pound per ticket, a 2.5 percent tax on restaurant meals and a gasoline tax of 1 pound for each 20 liters of gasoline.

Taxation has not stopped here; the Phalangist agencies have imposed a tax on all real estate office transactions, amounting to tens of thousands of pounds on real estate sold in East and West Beirut, since all transactions must be recorded in real estate offices.

The Phalangist Party records all real estate exchanges by means of a bureau and committees, headquartered in the Alexander Hotel in al-Ashrafiyah. No transaction can be recorded before obtaining a permit from this bureau.

As for illegal ports, the partition measures took on a new dimension when the Phalangists established an agency to administer the eight ports falling under their control. Although these measures were taken to stop

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smuggling, according to the party statement, they made smuggling a legal operation through the Phalangist Party, as if its presence were the same as the legitimate presence of the state.

Informed sources say that the situation in Beirut Port is not better than that in any other port, because what is collected through customs in the illegal ports is collected through bribery in Beirut Port. This may amount to as much as 12 percent of the value of the goods. This is what happened to a number of merchants who paid such fees and then, because of this went back to shipping their goods by land through Syrian ports, or by air through Beirut International Airport.

Changing Educational Curricula

4. Educational partition: In recent weeks, the Lebanese were surprised when they attended graduation ceremonies at branches of the Lebanese University in eastern areas, because the ceremonies resembled closed party celebrations.

The fact is, the branches of the Lebanese University are under the control of the Phalangist Student Administration. The administration has imposed on the university's administration its own choice of college directors in the branches located in eastern areas, as well as professors and members of branch councils.

Educational sources in Beirut say that Phalangist control has imposed, on some branches, curricula and subjects unrelated to the set curricula, and has forced professors to agree to visiting lecturers, who are party members, to give lectures to political, social sciences and economics classes in particular.

As for secondary and elementary school classes, the extent of Phalangist Party domination over the public and private institutes has become obvious through the examinations. Informed sources say that Maronite monks have helped the Phalangist Party implement its control, and that the party presence in these institutes is a basic factor in their administration according to party desires. It is also a factor in the conscription of combatants and the closing of secondary schools during times of military confrontations, so that fighting students would not lose out on subjects they were taking.

Educational sources say that the next school year will bring about changes in the schools in the eastern regions, encompassing curricula and books, especially those pertaining to Lebanon's political history.

5. Information partition: Information partition was perhaps one of the most outstanding Phalangist Party moves in 1975-76. The party has continued to stimulate this sector recently. In addition to official journalistic concessions like the newspaper AL-'AMAL and specialized

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study publications, the Phalangist Party owns an illegal news agency and the illegal "Voice of Lebanon" radio.

Recently it has tried to start television transmission, but the battle now raging between the state and the party has delayed this project in view of new circumstances. Phalangist television has camera equipment and a small studio in the teachers' union building in Juniyah. It also has color television transmission equipment on Jabal Harisa, overlooking the town. The party has recruited a group of graduates and technicians for the new television project, under pressure of arms, invitation and intimidation.

Television transmission is supervised by an employee of Lebanese TV, Anton Jumhuri. The programs are directed by a former employee of Radio Lebanon, Ibrahim al-Khuri. The various cultural programs are directed by Mrs Laura Gharib. The news programs are directed by Eli Salibi, who was a television news editor for several years before the war.

The most serious aspect of Phalangist television is that it interferes with one of the legitimate television channels, Channel 12. So far, the state has been able to stand firm, and has resorted to bringing in strong jamming devices to interrupt Phalangist transmission.

Politicians attach great importance to such Phalangist activities, and see hidden meanings in them, because they are an attack directed at the state while a search is under way for a government which will implement the principles of accord, the foremost of which is stopping illegitimate information agencies.

6. Judicial partition: When the Phalangist agencies arrest a person, they refer him to the courts, represented by a legal apparatus consisting of judges. Some of these are retired; others are justice ministry judges who work in the afternoon studying files and issuing verdicts in the interest of the Phalangist Party.

The Phalangist judicial system has judges, public prosecutors, lawyers, a reference bureau, a defense fund and a prison. This apparatus has in the last few months handed down a number of verdicts. This led a number of lawyers and judges to meet together and demand that the state and the political forces respect the official judicial system, and not interfere with its affairs or intimidate it, inasmuch as it is a yardstick for freedom in Lebanon.

7. Legislative partition: Recently a most remarkable study was issued by the Kaslik University calling for the establishment of a popularly elected legislative council to administer the "liberated regions." The Lebanese press published this study, which was considered the starting point for a Phalangist dialog with the National Liberals Party. Phalangist sources believe that a decision on this legislative council

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may possibly be reached by the end of this summer, so as to complement partition measures.

After all of this, and after all of these partition measures, does the president of the European Community, Gaston Thorn, believe that it is necessary to proclaim partition to make it a fact?

National Movement sources say that one of the reasons for the standstill in the political situation is the general fear of falling into the Phalangists' snare, where the choice would be between Phalangist dominance or partition. National Movement sources add that the Phalangists are talking and maneuvering, but implementing their measures without any hesitation. This in itself makes a dialog with them fruitless.

As for Gaston Thorn, he will return to Europe, with the thorn pricking its side possibly deeper. One sure thing is that the European initiative will be, as usual, an ex post facto attempt to calm down international repercussions. What is needed to thwart this extremist partition [in Lebanon] is an Arab stand which would move beyond words into action, and which would actually do everything in its power to stamp out partition, so that what is happening now will not be the first bead of a long rosary.

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LEBANON

RIVAL NORTHERN MARONITE LEADER STRESSES LEBANON'S ARABISM

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 15-21 Aug 80 p 26

[Interview with al-Mardah Leader Yusuf Yammin, Conducted by al-Quds Baras]

[Text] This interview was conducted with the "other" Maronite voice--the voice of the northern Maronites, which is completely different from the voice of the Phalangists. What is the tone of this voice?

Father Yusuf Yammin is the founder of the armed al-Mardah Brigade in northern Lebanon, and the supervisor of the "Free United Lebanon Radio," which is the mouthpiece of former president Sulayman Franjiyah and the Maronites of the north of Lebanon.

The northern Maronites have their own points of view which are completely different from those of the Lebanese Phalangist Party. This interview with Father Yammin makes clear just how dissimilar the stands are, and also just how much these original Maronites are concerned about the need for interaction and harmony with the Arab milieu surrounding them.

[Question] How do you envisage the role of Arab Lebanon? In particular, what is the role of the northern Maronites in this context?

[Answer] As a Lebanese, I will start out first with my Lebanese-ness. I feel that whether Lebanon is open to everyone, especially the Arabs, or not, its fundamental mission is to be open to other civilizations, primarily to the natural Arab milieu. Therefore, Lebanon's Arab affiliations and its commercial and cultural role are what has distinguished its history.

The second aspect which must be brought up is that the land of Lebanon was receptive to races, nationalities, religions and cultures, with all these currents interacting and complementing each other.

This means that Lebanon cannot be isolated, as it would be if a fanatic Christian state or Maronite mini-state were to be established there, as the Phalangist desire.

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From our point of view, we are northern Maronites, and we, with Sulayman Franjiyah at the apex of the pyramid, have taken a stand which arises from Lebanon's nature, heritage, and the fact of its Arab affiliations. This is in contrast to the Phalangist plan and the plot which the super-powers have drawn up and which the Phalangists and Israel are implementing.

Sulayman Franjiyah's concern has been to preserve the original Lebanese heritage and the formula for openness and communication among all Lebanese, concentrating first of all on openness and cooperation with our Arab brothers.

[Question] Do you believe that the Phalangist Party really wants partition, and if so, what is the purpose of this partition?

[Answer] The Phalangists' immediate aim is to serve the Zionist enemy in every way, by creating small, weak, fanatic, sectarian mini-states around Israel--i.e. by creating a racist Maronite state in the manner of Israel. The Phalangist Party initiated its scheme by killing off the original Maronites.

The responsibility of warding off the danger of the Phalangist plot falls to all Lebanese and to our Arab brothers, because the issue does not concern Lebanon alone, but the entire Arab region, Syria in particular. It is a spark which will be followed by the breaking out of regional sectarian and doctrinal splits.

[Question] How do you explain the northern Maronite's aversion to the plots of the Phalangist Party?

[Answer] History tells us that there were two currents pulling the Maronites back and forth: a current of withdrawn, closed isolation, concentrated among the Maronites of Kisrwan, and an open, cooperative current represented by the Maronites of northern Lebanon.

This led to various social, geographic and demographic factors. The Maronites of Kisrwan constitute a Maronite unit which has not mixed with anyone around it, while the northern Maronite presence borders on all the Christian and Islamic sects.

Furthermore, you must not forget that there is a line embodied in the leaders and families which sought inspiration from the Lebanon of the original heritage and which made the nationalist leanings more profound, such as the Franjiyah family, which represents the Maronite line which is open to its Arab surroundings.

In the 1950's, Sulayman's brother Hamid Franjiyah was elected head of the Conference of Arab People. His late father also enjoyed a spirit of openness towards the Arab milieu. Sulayman has followed the calling of his family heritage.

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They Killed Tony Because of This

[Question] Has the Phalangist Party tried to draw you into the partition plan you spoke of?

[Answer] It was proven to them and to Israel that there was one obstacle standing between them and the Maronite Christians--Sulayman Franjiyah and his son Tony. For this reason, Tony and three young companions were killed in the Idhin massacre.

In fact, the Phalangists began with the small, weak Maronite Christian forces like the Maronite Organization in Bdaru and the Maronite League. Then they weakened the Cedar Guards and removed their thorns. After that, they turned their attention to larger Maronite forces like the Aqurah and the Raynum, and then the non-Maronite Christians like the Armenians. Then they tried Zagharta, and finally wiped out the National Liberal Party, the last of their allies.

I am fully convinced that they are implementing Israeli plots to the letter, just as Israel orders. They have obviously made great progress in establishing a racist Maronite state.

[Question] Do you believe that the renegade Maj Sa'd Haddad has a part in Phalangist planning?

[Answer] Israel is planning to occupy some areas of southern Lebanon up to the Litani River, either directly through its army or under cover of its agent Sa'd Haddad. Thus the outlines of the conspiracy are becoming clear: the Litani will be for the enemy and the Kisrwan, northern al-Matn and East Beirut areas will be for the Phalangists. Thus the enemy will be able to avoid the danger posed by the Palestinians by settling them in Lebanon, for example.

[Question] What do you propose the Lebanese groups do to thwart this plot?

[Answer] Intelligence and knowledge are the bases for any sound course of action. In the regions controlled by the Phalangists, ignorance of the role of the Christians and the Maronites prevails. They also fall under the sway of pressure, violence and hatred.

If everyone returned to Christ, everything would be solved. The Messiah did not call for murdering and exterminating the innocent.

[Question] What do you propose the Palestinians do to help solve the Lebanese crisis?

[Answer] I refer you first to the stand taken by Sulayman Franjiyah at the highest international authority, the United Nations, when he

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represented all the Arabs in defending the Palestinian cause from a higher, humane point of view. I will then say that the Palestinians have a just, sacred cause, the that the Lebanese have given them something that none of the other Arabs have. Therefore, it is a joint Arab responsibility, to which everyone should contribute as much as he is able.

As we see it, today we are facing dangers which threaten Lebanon. It is natural for us to give absolute priority to warding off these dangers, for it is not fair that the struggle for the Palestinian cause take place over the corpse of Lebanon.

[Question] Al-Mardah--what is the origin of this name?

[Answer] The word is Amharic, i.e. New Canaanite. Mardu was the god of the mountains among the people of the region stretching from Antakiya to Mount Carmel 2,600 years before Christ.

The Mardah has three characteristics. First, they are mountain people, in whom the mountains reflect strength, impregnability and steadfastness. Secondly, they have a tendency towards independence. Third, they are inclined towards religious openness.

Therefore, al-Mardah is a word with military connotations. Its role is to resist attacks without discriminating between one religion and another. In fact, their greatest battles were with the Byzantines, who were as you know Christians.

Today al-Mardah is a force defending Lebanon.

[Question] You are known as the shepherd of the combatants. What is the Christian precept about that?

[Answer] I am an Arab Lebanese Maronite Christian priest who feels that Lebanon is in danger. Therefore, I am entitled to defend not just myself but the values, heritage, culture and civilization which Lebanon and the Arabs represent.

The Messiah was not a weakling. When he saw that the Jews had defiled the Temple of Jerusalem, he scourged them.

[Question] As an Arab Christian, how do you view Jerusalem? How do you see your Arabism manifested vis-a-vis the Arab Palestinian cause?

[Answer] Jerusalem is the capital of the three divine religions, and today it is unfortunately trampled under the shoes of the Zionist movement, instead of being a terrestrial capital for the heavenly religions.

When we say that we are Arabs, we are operating from the original historical concept of Arabism. Being Arab does not mean that you are Moslem,

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for there are Moslem and Christian Arabs. Our Arabism is manifested vis-a-vis the Arabs, just as Sulayman Franjiyah embodied it by defending the Arabism of Jerusalem and Palestine.

Here I would like to pause over the Arab Gulf region, where many Lebanese are working. It is a shining example of our relations with our Arab environment. There are thousands of Lebanese working and playing a recognized role in the life of their brothers in the Arab Gulf, who in turn are playing a similar role in helping the Lebanese. Here I would like to express my feelings of gratitude for what they are providing us.

I would like to say that such relations prove that we are in daily contact with our Arab milieu, and that our Arabism is manifested in this contact.

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TUNISIA

FEATURES OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WITHOUT MOKADDEM ANALYZED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 10 Sep 80 pp 34, 35

[Article by Souhayr Belhassen: "The 'Irreplaceable' Speaker Leaves"]

[Text] The features of the Tunisian Assembly are changing, with newly-elected members and, no doubt, with a new Speaker.

The most significant event in Tunis, in this month of the return from vacations, is that the president will no longer be the president. Let us be clear about this: it concerns the president of the National Assembly, Dr Sadok Mokaddem, in this office for 16 years, to the point that people believed, and that he believed himself, that he could not be moved, that he was an integral part of the system and of its furnishings. It is accepted that he is to leave (not voluntarily, but non the less certainly).

Immobilism

When it meets in October at the Bardo Palace, the assembly will certainly not reelect Dr Mokaddem. Let us say that his eventual successor, the man whom they are thinking of at highlevels of the government to mark the change, is clearly younger and much more open. He is not yet a member of the assembly and therefore will have to be elected between now and October, in the course of one of the by-elections which will take place in the next few weeks. His name will create surprise when it is known.

The probable departure of the man who had become the symbol of political immobilism, coming after the equally astonishing departure of the attorney general of the republic, Mohamed Farhat, a symbol of juridical dependence which has lasted too long--does this mean that in Tunis it is a policy of change which has won out? Let us say, more prudently, that the Mzali government is still in the phase where, without great efforts of the imagination or too much resistance, it easily finds issues, habits (and men) to change. The stock of merchandise is far from being exhausted. But let us return to Dr Mokaddem, whose name, in Arabic, can be translated as "progressive"!

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For many years quite bald, with a protruding lower lip, with wide and stately gestures, slow of speech, skin the color of parchment, Dr Sadok Mokaddem has the physique of a prelate who attended a Jesuit school. He is more at home in his dimly illuminated office with its columns of marble, seated with a bouquet of wilting roses in front of him, or at his ease in a cafe with an orange tree in blossom outside, than on the "perch" of the National Assembly where, for 16 years, rather for the worse than for the better, he has done everything he could do to maintain himself.

Although ranking third in the hierarchy of leaders of the state, after the president of the republic and the prime minister, the president of the National Assembly should not have lasted long in this post, except in terms of the concept which Bourguiba had of the role of Parliament in a presidential regime directed by himself: something between an association of men formerly active in political life and a club (in which no member is to make trouble). In the role of wet blanket Bourguiba knew from experience that Dr Mokaddem could not be equalled. In effect Mokaddem has moved through important positions at important moments in the history of his country without being marked by them and without making himself remarked on.

In 1952, when the armed struggle began in Tunisia, he was entrusted with the direction of the "political intelligence bureau of the party." During the Youssefist revolt, which followed in the wake of Nasserism, he held the post of ambassador to Cairo and, after independence was achieved, he was the first minister of foreign affairs. He held that post for 5 years.

#### A False Departure

In fact, Bourguiba is the true leader of Tunisian diplomacy. The war in Algeria, the bombing of Sakiet-Sidi Youssef, relations with France made the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs an executant of policy. Finally, as Ambassador to France between 1962 and 1964, he began his duties with the crisis of Bizerte and ended them with the nationalization of land. Having experienced the moods of Nasir and those of Bourguiba, he lived through the tension between De Gaulle and Bourguiba.

After such experiences he thought that no one expected that he would do more than plunge himself into the soft purring of parliamentary "debates." Since 1964 he has had a single impulse to take action in a political sense. A member of the Destour party since 1930, Dr Mokaddem had the reputation of a hard-liner when, on 26 October 1971, he resigned from the political bureau of the PSD (Destour Socialist Party), thus placing himself at some distance from President Bourguiba, who refused to consider certain liberal decisions taken at the eighth congress of the party. He courted disgrace when, in January, 1974, following the proclamation of union with Libya, Prime Minister Hedi Nouira issued an appeal for national unity. Dr Mokaddem then seized the occasion to withdraw his resignation, and he was readmitted to the Political Bureau.

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Now 66 years of age, if he has reached the age of retirement, he still has considerable force at his disposal, above all that of inertia. Dr Mokaddem says that he conceives of the role of the Assembly rather as a complement of government action than as a counterweight.

#### The Violins of Ingres

Reviewing his career as speaker of the assembly, he says that its members are still "young and inexperienced, but the consolidation of institutional machinery is well on the road." The formula reflects the attitude of conformism of the members of the assembly: rejuvenated, renewed as a result of the double lists in 1979, the assembly nevertheless remains affected with arteriosclerosis. If the present determination of the authorities to wish to change political customs is pursued, the forthcoming opening of Parliament will take place under the sign of change. Two members involved in criminal matters have been dismissed from their positions. It is expected--and has been announced--that others, about 10 in number, will follow them.

Therefore, there will be seats available, and by-elections will soon take place, which will certainly see non-Destour candidates present themselves to the voters. One such is Mr Ahmed Mestiri, who has told us: "We want to have our place in our representative institutions. If conditions permit it, we are thinking seriously of running." Others in addition to him, closer to Bourguiba, will be invited to run.

If this were the way things are, the whole concept of parliamentary life would be transformed. And "Speaker Mokaddem" would have to give up his position. Probably as of this year or, at the latest, at the return from vacations in 1981. Then Mokaddem could finally turn his attentions to his violins of Ingres: listen to the songs of an old classmate, now dead, Ali Riahi, and satisfy his curiosity in old stones.

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TUNISIA

BRIEFS

POW'S BACK HOME--The 250 Tunisians belonging to Libya's expeditionary corps, returned to their country in July 1980. In early 1979 they tried to save Idi Amin Dada in Uganda. Their return was the result of long negotiations conducted by the Tunisian government with Uganda and Tanzania. The Libyan prisoners (just over 50 of them) had been handed back to colonel Qadhaffi at the end of November 1979, thanks to petro-dollars it is claimed. Captured by Tanzanian troops fighting with opponents of Idi Amin Dada, the Tunisians lived for nearly 15 months under unimaginable conditions. Tunisia reports that their health is absolutely deplorable. For this reason they have been quarantined inside a camp in the interior of the country. One thing is certain: that is not the only reason for the secrecy shrouding their return. Those men were some of the most seasoned members of Qadhaffi's "foreign legion." They might have altered the outcome of the attack on Gafsa (South Tunisia) by Libyan commandos in late January 1980. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Sep 80 p 40]

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